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Abstract 
 
Providing security for wireless sensor networks in hostile enviro ments has a 
significant importance. Resilience against malicious attacks during the process of 
location discovery has an increasing need. There are many applications that rely on 
sensor nodes' locations to be accurate in order to function correctly. The need to provide 
secure, attack resistant location discovery schemes has become a challenging research 
topic. In this thesis, location discovery techniques are discussed and the security threats 
and attacks are explained. I also present current secure location discovery schemes which 
are developed for range-based location discovery.  
The thesis goal is to develop a secure range-free location discovery scheme. This is 
accomplished by enhancing the voting-based scheme developed in [8, 9] to be used as the 
bases for developing a secure range-free location discovery scheme. Both the 
enhancement voting-based and the secure range-free schemes are implemented on Sun 
SPOT wireless sensors and subjected to various levels of location discovery attacks and 
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Chapter 1  
INTRODUCTION 
 
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN) are networks made of small, battery-powered, 
memory-constrained devices called sensor nodes, which have the capability of wireless 
communication over a restricted area. Due to memory and power constaints, they need 
to be well-arranged to build a fully functional network. Wireless sensors' locations are 
vital to many sensor network applications such as environmental monitoring, military 
applications, and many other applications which require sensors' location information to 
fulfill their tasks.  There are also several fundamental techniques [8] developed for 
wireless sensor networks which require wireless sensor nodes' locations, for instance 
geographic routing protocols where sensor nodes make routing decisions based on their 
own location as well as their neighbors' locations.  
Despite recent advances, location discovery for wireless sensor networks in hostile 
environments has been typically overlooked. Most of the existing location discovery 
protocols are vulnerable in the presence of malicious attacks. An attacker may provide 
incorrect location references by replaying the beacon packets int rcepted in different 
locations. Furthermore, an attacker may compromise a beacon node and distribute 
malicious location references by lying about the beacon node’s location or manipulating 
the beacon signals. In either of these cases, non-beacon nodes will determine their 
locations incorrectly. The security of location discovery can certainly be enhanced by 
authentication. However, authentication does not guarantee the security of location 
discovery. An attacker may forge beacon packets with keys learned through 
compromised nodes, or replay beacon signals intercepted in different locations [8]. 
Several attack-resistant location estimation techniques were dev loped to tolerate 
the malicious attacks against range-based location discovery in wireless sensor networks. 
This thesis focuses on the voting-based location estimation technique developed in [8, 9], 
where the deployment field is quantized into a grid of cells and has each location 
reference vote on the cells in which the node may reside with iterativ  refinement of the 
voting results so that it can be executed in resource constrained sensor nodes. 
The thesis work provides enhancement over the voting-based location discovery 
estimation to simplify it further and make it adaptable for use in range-free schemes. The 
enhanced voting-based technique would be applied to develop a secure range-free 
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location discovery scheme. This would provide a less complicated, cost-effective, and 
more applicable solution for wireless sensor networks. 
 
1.1 Classification of Localization Techniques 
1.1.1 Direct approaches 
This is also known as absolute localization. The direct approach itself can be classified 
into two types: Manual configuration and GPS-based localization. The manual 
configuration method is very cumbersome and expensive. It is neither practical nor 
scalable for large scale WSNs and in particular, does not adapt well for WSNs with node 
mobility. On the other hand, in the GPS-based localization method, each s nsor is 
equipped with a GPS receiver. This method adapts well for WSNs with node mobility.  
However, there is a downside to this method. It is not economically feasible to 
equip each sensor with a GPS receiver since WSNs are deployed with hundreds of 
thousands of sensors. This increases the size of each sensor, rendering them unfit for 
pervasive environments. Also, the GPS receivers only work well outdoors on earth and 
have line-of-sight requirement constraints. Such WSNs cannot be used for underwater 
applications like habitat monitoring, water pollution level monitoring, and tsunami 
monitoring [1]. 
 
1.1.2 Indirect approaches 
The indirect approach of localization is also known as relative localization since nodes 
position themselves relative to other nodes in their vicinity. The indirect approaches of 
localization were introduced to overcome some of the drawbacks of the GPS-based direct 
localization techniques while retaining some of their advantages, like accuracy of 
localization. In this approach, a small subset of nodes in the network, called the beacon 
nodes, are either equipped with GPS receivers to compute their location or are manually 
configured with their location. These beacon nodes then send beams of signals providing 
their location to all sensor nodes in their vicinity that do not have a GPS receiver. Using 
the transmitted signal containing the location information, sensor nodes compute their 
location. This approach effectively reduces the overhead introduced by the GPS-based 
method [1].  
However, since the beacon nodes are also operating in the same hostile environment 
as the sensor nodes, they too are vulnerable to various threats, including physical capture 
by adversaries. This introduces new security threats concerning the honesty of the beacon 
nodes in providing location information since they could have been tampered with by the 
adversary and misbehaves by providing incorrect location information [1].  
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Within the indirect approach, the localization process can be classified into the 
following two categories: 
 
Range-based: 
In range-based localization, the location of a node is computed relative to other nodes in 
its vicinity. Range-based localization depends on the assumption that the absolute 
distance between a sender and a receiver can be estimated by one or more features of the 
communication signal from the sender to the receiver. The accuracy of such estimation, 
however, is subject to the transmission medium and surrounding environment. Range 
based techniques usually rely on complex hardware which is not feasible for WSNs since 
sensor nodes are highly resource-constrained and have to be produced at throw-away 
prices as they are deployed in large numbers. The features of the communication signal 
that are frequently used in literature for range-based localization are as follows: 
• Angle of Arrival (AoA): Range information is obtained by estimating and 
mapping relative angles between neighbors.  
• Received Signal Strength Indicator (RSSI): Use a theoretical or empirical model 
to translate signal strength into distance. RADAR [1, 11] is one of the first to 
make use of RSSI. 
• Time of Arrival (ToA): To obtain range information using ToA, the signal 
propagation time from source to destination is measured. A GPS is the most basic 
example that uses ToA. To use ToA for range estimation, a system ne ds to be 
synchronous, which necessitates the use of expensive hardware for precise clock 
synchronization with the satellite.  
• Time Difference of Arrival (TDoA): To obtain the range information using 
TDoA, an ultrasound is used to estimate the distance between the node and the 
source. Like ToA, TDoA necessitates the use of special hardware, rendering it too 
expensive for WSNs. 
 
Range-free: 
Range-free localization never tries to estimate the absolute point to point distance based 
on received signal strength or other features of the received communication signal like 
time, angle, etc. This greatly simplifies the design of hardwae, making range-free 
methods very appealing and a cost-effective alternative for localization in WSNs. 
Amorphous localization [12], Centroid localization [10], APIT [18], DV-Hop l calization 
[3], SeRLoc [5] are some examples of range-free localization techniques [1]. 
 
 
1.2 Security Threats Associated with Location Discovery
In hostile environments, an 
via injecting misleading location references. The attacker can either be an insider or an 
outsider. As an insider, the attacker has access to all of the cryptographic keyi
held by a node. This is potentially dangerous since the attacker can now claim to be a 
legitimate part of the network. Authentication or verification via password and other 
mechanisms give up under this attack model. On the other hand, in the o
model, the attacker is outside the network and has no information about cryptographic 
keys and passwords necessary for authentication. The attacker can only capture a node 
but cannot extract the sensitive information. This model is comparati
detrimental, but harmful nonetheless. So, for localization process to be secured it has to 
be robust in its defense against both outsider and insi er attacks [1].
Figure 1.1: Attack patterns against location discovery schemes [1, 8].
 
Some attacks that have been discussed for nearly a decade in lit rature that are the 
most common against localization schemes are as follows:
• Masquerading and Compromising Beacon Nodes:
attacker would impersonate a beacon node and send misleadi
its location to divert the other benign nodes from discovering their accurate 
location, as shown in 









 In masquerading, the 
ng information about 






   
misleading location references that would affect location discovery for other 
benign nodes, as shown in Figure 1.1(b) [8]. 
 
• Replay Attack: A replay attack is the easiest and most commonly used by 
attackers. Specifically, when an attacker’s capability is limited, i.e., th  attacker 
cannot compromise more than 1 node; this is the most preferred attack. In a replay 
attack, the attacker merely jams the transmission between a sender and a receiver 
and later replays the same message, posing as the sender. The other way to launch
a replay attack is, as shown in Figure 1.1(c). A replay attack has a two-fold 
consequence. First, the attacker is replaying the message of another node. Secnd,
the attacker is transmitting stale information. In particular, the chances of the 
information being stale are higher in networks with higher node mobility. When 
replay attacks are launched on the localization process, a localizing node will 
receive an incorrect reference thereby localizing incorrectly. Unlike a wormhole 
attack, a single node can disrupt the network with a replay attack [1, 8]. 
 
• Sybil Attack: The Sybil attack requires a more sophisticated attacker compared 
to the replay attack. In a Sybil attack, a node claims multiple identities in the 
network. When launched on localization, localizing nodes can receive multiple 
location references from a single node leading to incorrect location estimation. 
Like the replay attack, the Sybil attack can also be launched by a single node 
since there is no need for collusion among nodes to launch this attack [1]. 
 
• Wormhole Attack: A wormhole attack is the most complicated of all the 
mentioned attacks. To launch a wormhole attack, the attacker has to compromise 
at least two nodes. In The colluding nodes in the network, tunnel messages are 
transmitted in one part of the network to their colluding partners in other parts of 
the network. The effect of a wormhole attack on localization is depicted in Figure 
1.1(d). Here, node A is sending its reference to nodes B and C. However, since 
there is a wormhole link between C and G, G can locally replay the location 
reference of A in its neighborhood, misleading node F. Consequently, F will 
compute its location incorrectly. Intuitively, wormhole attacks pose more serious 
problems in range-free localization compared to range-based localization [1]. 
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Chapter 2  
EXISTING SECURE LOCATION DISCOVERY SCHEMES 
 
Several techniques have been developed to deal with the security problems of 
location discovery in wireless sensor networks. The location verification technique 
proposed in Secure Verification of Location Claims [14] can be used to verify the relative 
distance between a verifying node and a sensor node. However, it does not provide a 
solution to conduct secure location estimation at non-beacon nodes. A robust location 
detection is developed in Robust Location Detection [13] using the idea of majority 
voting, but it cannot be directly applied in resource constrained sensor networks due to its 
high computation and storage overheads. A robust statistical method is in ependently 
discovered in Robust Statistical Method [7] to achieve robustness through Least Median 
of Squares.  
SeRLoc [5] protects location discovery with the help of sectored antennae at beacon 
nodes. Similar to the voting-based scheme, SeRLoc can tolerate malicious attacks by 
adopting the idea of majority voting. SPINE [2] was developed to protect location 
discovery by using verifiable multi-lateration. However, the distance bounding 
techniques required for verifiable multi-lateration may not be avail ble in sensor 
networks due to the difficulties in dealing with the external attacks in ultrasound-based 
distance bounding and achieving nanosecond processing and time measurements in radio-
based distance bounding. ROPE [6] is developed by integrating SeRLoc and SPINE. 
However, it still requires nanosecond processing and time measurements that are not 
desirable for the current generation of sensor networks.  
MMSE [8, 9] is a recently developed scheme that deals with malicious attacks 
against location discovery using statistical approach, where minimum ean square is 
used as an indicator to identify and remove the inconsistent malicious location referenc s. 
In [8, 9], they have also developed a secure discovery scheme that adopts an iteratively 
refined voting scheme to tolerate malicious location references i troduced by attackers. 
Both statistical and voting based approaches are purely based on a range based location 
discovery scheme, where the location references may come from beacon nodes that are 
either single hop or multiple hops away, or from those non-beacon nodesthat already 
estimated their location [9]. In this thesis, the work will be focused on voting based 




   
2.1 Statistical Based Location Discovery Scheme: 
Intuitively, a location reference introduced by a malicious attack is aimed at misleading a 
sensor node about its location. Thus, it is usually different from benign location 
references. When there are redundant location references, there must be ome 
inconsistency between the malicious location references and the benign ones (an attacker 
may still have a location reference consistent with the benign ones after changing both 
the location and the distance values. However, such a location reference will not generate 
significantly negative impact on location determination). To take dvantage of this 
observation, the inconsistency among the location references are used to identify the 
malicious ones, and discard them before finally estimating the locations at sensor nodes 
[9]. 
In a statistical based scheme, the sensor node uses a Minimum Mean Square Error 
(MMSE) based method to estimate its own location. Thus, most current range-based 
localization methods can be used with this technique. To harness this observation, the 
sensor’s location is first estimated with the MMSE-based method and then assessed if the 
estimated location could be derived from a set of consistent location references. If so, the 
estimation result is accepted; otherwise, the most inconsistet location references are 
identified and removed, and the same process is repeated. This proces may continue 
until a set of consistent location references is found or it is not possible to find such a set 
[9]. 
 
2.1.1. Checking the consistency of location references 
The mean square error ς2 of the distance measurements based on the estimated location is 
used as an indicator of the degree of inconsistency, since all the MMSE-based methods 
estimate a sensor node’s location by (approximately) minimizing this mean square error 
[9]. 
Definition 1: Given a set of location references   , , 	
, , , 	
,  ,
, , 	
 and a location ,  estimated based on L, the mean square error of this 
location estimation is: 
   	    





           2.1 
Intuitively, the more inconsistent a set of location references is, the greater the 
corresponding mean square error should be. A simple, threshold-based method is use  to 
determine if a set of location references  obtained at a sensor node is τ-consistent with 
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respect to a MMSE-based method if the method gives an estimated location ,  such 
that the mean square error of this location estimation is [9]: 
   	    





! "           2.2 
 
2.1.2. Identifying the largest consistent set 
Since the MMSE-based methods can deal with measurement errors better if there are 
more benign location references, as many benign location references should be kept as 
possible while the malicious ones are removed. This implies the larg st set of consistent 
location references should be achieved. 
 
Brute-force Algorithm (BARMMSE): Given a set L of n location references and a 
threshold τ, a simple approach to computing the largest set of τ-consistent location 
references is to check all subsets of L with i location references about τ-consistency, 
where i starts from n and drops until a subset of L is found to be τ-consistent or it is not 
possible to find such a set. Thus, if the largest set of consistent location references 
consists of m elements, a sensor node has to use the MMSE method at least 1 
# $  1%    #
$
$% times to find the right one. If n = 10 and m = 5, a node needs to 
perform the MMSE method for at least 387 times. It is certainly not desirable to do such 
expensive operations on resource constrained sensor nodes [9].  
 
Greedy Algorithm (GARMMSE): To reduce the computation on sensor nodes, a greedy 
algorithm can be used, which is simple but suboptimal. This greedy algorithm works in 
rounds. It starts with the set of all location references in the first round. In each round, it 
first verifies if the current set of location references is τ-consistent. If so, the algorithm 
outputs the estimated location and stops. Optionally, it may also output the set of location 
references. Otherwise, it considers all subsets of location referenc s with one fewer 
location reference, and chooses the subset with the least mean square error as the input to 
the next round. This algorithm continues until it finds a set of τ-consistent location 
references or when it is not possible to find such a set (i.e., there are only three remaining 
location references) [9]. 
The greedy algorithm significantly reduces the computational overhead in sensor 
nodes. To continue the earlier example, a sensor node only needs to perform MMSE 
operations about 50 times (instead of 387 times) using this algorithm. In general, a sensor 
node needs to use a MMSE-based method for at most 1  $  $  1    4  1 
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'()'*+
  times. However, the greedy algorithm cannot guarantee that it can always 
identify the largest consistent set. It is possible that benign location references are 
removed, which generates a big impact on the accuracy of location estimation, especially 
when there are multiple malicious location references. To deal with this problem, an 
enhanced greedy algorithm was developed based on an efficient approach to identify the 
most suspicious location reference from a set of location references [9]. 
 
Enhanced Greedy Algorithm (EARMMSE): In the previous discussion, only the 
consistency of 3 or more location references was considered. A further investigation also 
reveals that two benign location references are usually consistent with each other such 
that there exists at least one location in the deployment field on which both location 
references agree. Hence, when the majority of location referenc s are benign, many 
location references can usually be found so that they are consistent with a benign location 
reference. In addition, when a malicious location reference tries to create a larger location 
error, the number of location references that are consistent with the malicious one will 
decrease quickly [9]. 
According to the above discussion, for each location reference the number of 
location references that are consistent with this location reference can simply be counted. 
This number is called the degree of consistency and can be used to rank the 
suspiciousness of the location references received at a particular non-beacon node. The 
smaller the degree is, the more likely that the corresponding location reference is 
malicious [9].  
The consistency between two location references can be verified as follows. F r any 
location reference , , 	
, the non-beacon node derives the area that it may reside based 
on this location reference. This area can be represented by a ring centered at (x, y), with 
the inner radius max {δ- ,, 0} and the outer radius (δ+ ,), where , is the maximum 
distance error. For the sake of presentation, such a ring is referred to as the candidate ring 
(centered) at location (x, y). The non-beacon node then checks whether the candidate 
rings of two location references overlap each other. If the candidte rings overlap, they 
are consistent; otherwise, they are not consistent [9]. 
The algorithm to check whether the candidate rings of two location references, 
-  . , ., 	.
 and /  0 , 0 , 	0
, overlap can be done efficiently in the following 
way: Let dab denote the distance between (xa, ya) and (xb, yb) and let rmax(x) and rmin(x) 
denote the outer radius and the inner radius of the candidate ring of location reference x, 
respectively. We can easily figure out that the candidate ringsof location references a
and b will not overlap when any of the following three conditions are true:  
(1) dab > rmax(a) + rmax(b),  
10 
   
(2) dab + rmax(a) < rmin(b) and  
(3) dab + rmax(b) < rmin(a). 
Similar to the greedy algorithm, the enhanced algorithm has to identify the largest 
consistent set starting with the set of all location references in the first round. In each 
round, it verifies whether the current set of location references is τ-consistent. If the 
current set is τ-consistent, the algorithm outputs the estimated location and stops. 
Optionally, it may also output the set of location references. Otherwise, the algorithm 
removes the location reference corresponding to the smallest degree and uses the 
remaining location references as the input to the next round. This algorithm continues 
until it finds a set of τ-consistent location references or when it is not possible to find 
such a set (i.e., there are only three remaining location references) [9]. 
The enhanced algorithm not only improves the accuracy of location estimation in 
the presence of malicious attacks, but also reduces the computation overhead 
significantly since it can identify the most suspicious location reference efficiently and 
effectively. To continue the earlier example, a non-beacon node only needs to perform 
MMSE operations five times. In general, a non-beacon node needs to use a MMSE-based 
method, at most, n-3 times [9]. 
 
2.2 Voting Based Scheme 
In this approach, each location reference votes on the locations at which the node of 
concern may reside. To facilitate the voting process, the target field is quantized into a 
grid of cells, and each sensor node determines how likely it is in each cell based on each 
location reference. The cell(s) with the highest vote is selected and the center of the 
cell(s) used as the estimated location. To deal with the resource constraints on sensor 
nodes, an iterative refinement scheme is developed to reduce the storage overhead, 
improve the accuracy of estimation, and make the voting scheme efficient on resource 
constrained sensor nodes [9]. 
 
2.2.1. The basic scheme 
After collecting a set of location references, a sensor node determines the target field. The 
node does so by first identifying the minimum rectangle that covers all the locations 
declared in the location references, and then extending this rectangl  by Rb, where Rb is 
the maximum transmission range of a beacon signal. This extended rectangle forms the 
target field, which contains all possible locations for the sensor node. The sensor node 
then divides this rectangle into M small squares (cells) with the same side length L, as 
 
illustrated in Figure 2.1. (The node may further extend the target field to have square 
cells.) The node then keeps a voting state variable 
Figure 2
At the beginning of this algorithm, the non
candidate ring of each location reference. For example, in 
point A is a candidate ring at 
declared location at A. For each location reference
cells that overlap with the corresponding candidate ring and i
variables for these cells by 1. After the node processes all the location references, it
chooses the cell(s) with the highest vote, and usesit
estimated location of the sensor node
 
2.2.2. Iterative refinement 
The number of cells M (or equivalently, the quantization step 
the voting-based algorithm. It has several implications to the
approach. First, the larger M
thus the more storage required. Second, the
location estimation. The larger
node can determine its location more precise
candidate rings [9]. 
However, due to the resource constraints on sensor odes, the granularity
partition is usually limited by the memory available for the voting state
nodes. This puts a hard limit on the accuracy of location
problem, an iterative refinement 
accuracy with reduced storage overhead.
according to the memory constraint in a sensor node. After the first round of the 
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for ach cell, initially set to 0.
 
.1: The voting based location estimation [9]. 
 
-beacon node needs to identify the
Figure 2.1, the ring
A, which is derived from the location reference with the 
 , the sensor node identifies the 
crements the voting 
’ (their) geometric centroid
 [9]. 
L) is a critical parameter for 
performance of 
is, the more state variables a sensor node has to keep, and 
 value of M (or L) determines the precision of 
 M is, the smaller each cell will be. As a result, a sensor 
ly based on the overlap of the cells and the 
 variables on the 
 estimation. To address this 
is proposed to the above basic algorithm to achieve fine 




 centered at 
 
 as the 
this 
 of the 
M is chosen 
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algorithm, the node may find one or more cells having the largest vote. T  improve the 
accuracy of location estimation, the sensor node then identifies the smallest rectangle that 
contains all the cells having the largest vote, and performs the voting process again. For 
example, in Figure 2.1, the same algorithm will be performed in a rectangle which 
exactly includes the four cells having three votes [9]. 
By having a smaller rectangle to quantize in a later iteraton, he size of cells can be 
reduced, resulting in a higher precision. Moreover, a malicious location reference will 
most likely be discarded, since its candidate ring usually does not overlap with those 
derived from benign location references. For example, in Figure 2.1, the candidate ring 
centered at point D will not be used in the second iteration [9]. 
The iterative refinement process should terminate when a desire precision is 
reached or the estimation cannot be refined. The former condition can be tested by 
checking if the side length L of each cell is less than a predefined threshold S, while the 
latter condition can be determined by checking whether L remains the same in two 
consecutive iterations. The algorithm then stops and outputs the estimat d location 
obtained in the last iteration. It is easy to see that the algorithm will fall into either of 
these two cases, and thus will always terminate [9]. 
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Chapter 3  
PROPOSED SECURE LOCATION DISCOVERY SCHEMES 
 
The main focus of this thesis work was focused on the voting-based sch me developed in 
[8, 9], because it is more adaptive to be implemented on range-free location discovery 
schemes, whereas the statistical MMSE scheme developed in [8, 9] can only work on 
range-based location discovery schemes. The work took two phases, firt phase was to 
enhance voting-based location discovery scheme to be more applicable on wireless 
sensors without the usage of distance measurements, such as ToA or RSSI. The second 
phase was to develop a secure range-free location discovery scheme inspired by the 
enhanced voting-based technique. 
 
3.1 Enhanced Voting Based Scheme 
In sensor networks and other distributed systems, errors can often be mask d through 
fault tolerance, redundancy, aggregation, or by other means. Depending on the behavior 
and requirements of protocols using location information, varying granularities of error 
maybe appropriate from system to system. Acknowledging that the cost of the hardware 
required by range-based solutions maybe inappropriate in relation to the required location 
precision, researchers have sought alternative range-free solutions to the location 
discovery problem in sensor networks. These range-free solutions use only r gular radio 
modules as basics for location discovery; hence, they do not incur any additional 
hardware cost [18]. 
This argument gives inspiration to use other means to measure the distance between 
the sensor node and its location references without the need for the hardware associated 
with distance measurement, such as RSSI or ToA. In homogeneous wireless s nsor 
networks, where all sensor nodes have common radio coverage range, a good distance 
measure would be the combination of radio range and the number of hop counts between 
the sensor and the location references sources. The distance can be estimated as the 
product of the radio coverage range of the sensor node by the number of hop counts 




The sensor A receives three location references from sensors: U, V and W 
are approximately one, three and two hops away from sensor A
would perform the enhanced voting based location discovery to estimate its location at 
point p′. 
The enhanced voting-based location discovery scheme 
node once it receives enough location references to es imate its location. 
receiving a minimum of three location references
location discovery process. The location references 
deployment map for that sensor
the sensor node. Then the deployment map is quantized into smal
sensor node would initialize the voting state of thse cells to zero.
The voting process starts by 
reference. The candidate rings for 
with radius of Max[radio range × (hop count 
range × hop count). The second step in the voting process is to mark the cells that overlap 
with the corresponding candidate rings of each location reference
vote by 1. Checking the overlap of candidate rings and cells for a given location reference 




3.1: Enhanced Voting-Based Scheme. 
, espectively
can be initiated at 
 by a sensor node enables it to 
would be used to get the extent
, so that it contains all the location references received by 
l square cells
  
identifying the candidate rings for each location 
a location reference consist of two rings, an inner ring 
− 1), 0], and an outer ring of radius 
 and increment their 
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With the intention of checking to see if a given cell, such as cell 
candidate rings of reference point P, let 
distances between point P and the vertices of cell 
overlap with cell a if and only if the distance between point P and anyof the cell 
vertices fall between the candidate rings of point P:
Where:  
  Rinner is the inner candidate ring for location reference point P.
  Router is the outer candidate ring for location reference point P.
  dai(P) is the distance between point P and vertex 
 
After the node processes all the location references, 
vote and uses their geometrical centroid as the estimated location of the sensor node.
enhanced voting based scheme also supports iterative refinement as in the original 
scheme presented in [8, 9]. The cells with maxim
smaller cells and fed back into the voting process algorithm again to refine the estimated 
location results. 
The enhanced voting based location discovery scheme can be summarized in the 
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a, respectively. The candidate rings 
 
 
i of cell a. 
it selects the cells with highest 
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− Receive location references {(X1, Y1, Hops1), (X2, Y2, Hops2), ...}; 
− Determine the extents of deployment field: 
− Lower left corner = min. x-coordinate and y-coordinate values among the location 
reference; 
− Upper right corner = max. x-coordinate and y-coordinate values among the 
location reference; 
− Quantize the deployment field into small square cells; 
− For each cell in quantized deployment field, initialize the voting value to 0; 
− For each location reference (Xi, Yi, Hopsi) { 
o set innerRing radius = min[0, radioRange×(hopsi-1)] 
o set outerRing radius = radioRange × hopsi 
o for each cell in quantized deployment field { 
 if (distance (any cell vertex, (Xi, Yi)) >= innerRing  && <= outerRing) 
increment cell vote by 1; 
} 
} 
− highVoteCells = Get the set of cells with highest vote; 
− estimatedLocation = Compute the geometrical centroid of highVoteCells; 
− return estimatedLocation; 
 
3.2 Secure Range-Free Location Discovery Scheme 
Most of the security schemes presented so far focused on range-bsed location discovery 
schemes. The main thesis goal is to develop a secure range-free location discovery 
scheme inspired by voting-based scheme. The enhanced voting-based schemewill be 
applied to APIT [18] which is a range-free location discovery scheme, but does not have 
consideration of resilience against location discovery attacks. 
 
3.2.1 Area-based Point In Triangle location discovery scheme (APIT) 
APIT employs a novel area-based approach to perform location estimation by isolating 
the environment into triangular regions between beacon nodes, as shown in Figure 3.3. 
Nodes inside or outside of these triangular regions allow a node to narrow down the area 
in which it can potentially reside. By utilizing combinations of beacon nodes positions, 
the diameter of the estimated area where a node resides can bereduc d to provide good 




The theoretical method used to narrow down the possible area in which a target 
node resides is called the Point
three location references and tests whether it is inside the triangle formed by connec
these three references. APIT repeats this PIT test with different location references 
combinations until all combinations are exhausted or the required accuracy is achieved. 
At this point, APIT calculates the 
triangles in which a node resides to determine its s imated position 
The APIT algorithm can be broken down into four step :
1. Beacon exchange 
2. PIT testing  
3. APIT aggregation 
4. COG calculation 
These steps are performed at individual sensor 
The pseudo code for APIT algorithm is described below:
 
− Receive location reference
− InsideSet = ϕ // the set of triangles in which the sensor resides
− For (each triangle Ti 
o If (Point-In-Triangulation test (Ti) == true)
  InsideSet = InsideSet 
o If (accuracy(InsideSet) > enough)
  Break; 
}, 
/* Center of gravity (CoG




3: APIT location discovery scheme [18]. 
-I -Triangulation test (PIT). In this test, a node chooses 
Center of Gravity (COG) of the intersectio
[18]. 
 
odes in a purely distributed fashion. 
 
s (Xi, Yi) from N beacon nodes. 
 




) calculation */ 
 ( Ti  InsideSet); 
 
ting 
n of all the 
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The size of InsideSet is noticeably growing cubically with the number of location 
references received. For example, with 30 location references i a sensor network of 
1500 sensor nodes, the radio region will be divided by 4060 triangles into small pieces. If 
the PIT tests render correct inside/outside decisions, each decision w ll narrow down the 
area in which a target node can possibly reside, making the final error small [18]. 
 
3.2.2 Creating triangles from location references 
The major issue in developing a secure range-free location discovery scheme, which 
combines the security features of voting-based scheme [8, 9] and range-free estimation of 
APIT [18], is how to generate the triangle areas that will divide the deployment field into 
small regions. The regions that represent the highest intersection of those triangular areas 
will contain the estimated location of the sensor node. 
In APIT, a triangle is formed by any three location references chosen at random. 
The sensor node exhausts all the possible combinations of triangles formed by the 
location references that it received until it can find a combinatio  of triangles that gives a 
maximum intersectional region [18]. This process is very slow and might not provide the 
best accuracy required in the estimated location. Also, it does n t verify the credibility of 
the location references in regard to whether they are legitimate or comp omised. 
In range-free location discovery, the sensor node has no distance or direction 
measurements between itself and the location references that it receives; therefore, the 
sensor cannot predict inside which triangle it resides. Instead, the sensor node can have a 
rough estimation of its location with respect to the location references using the number 
of hops and radio transmission range. Figure 3.4, shows the method developed in this 




The sensor node picks the location
(the closest reference to this sensor)
reference as a guide point 
represents a triangle vertex, point 
directed towards the guide point, as shown in 





 Triangle creation method. 
 reference with the minimum number of hops 
, point P in this example, and uses 
to direct the triangles toward it. Each location reference 
A in this example, and the base of the triangle 












To increase the accuracy of estimated location of the sensor node, the triangle 
includes a smaller inner triangle that shares the same vertex defined by the location 
reference point. This provides the same effect 
based scheme. As a result, the region at which the sensor node is most likely to reside is: 




There are several mathematical algorithms and equations that can check
resides inside the triangle interior. In this thesis, the Barycentric Coordinates algorithm 
[19] was chosen. Barycentric coordinates are triples of numbers 
to masses placed at the vertices of a reference triangle 
determine a point P, which is the 
with coordinates (t1, t2, t3), as shown in 
Figure 3.5:
 
Let the three points of the triang
One of the points is chosen such that
considered as relative to that point. Next,
values to all the locations on the plane. 
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 whether a point 
(t1, t2, t3) corresponding 
∆ABC. These masses then 
geometric centroid of the three masses and is identified 
Figure 3.5. 
 Barycentric coordinates [19]. 
le define a plane in space, as shown in 
 we all other locations on the plane 
 basis vectors are needed to give coordinate 








and (B−A) are selected. Any point on the plane 
walking some distance along 
(B−A) [15].  
Figure 3.6:
 
With that in mind, we can des
 
According to the above equation, point 
if: u, v > 0, and u + v  1. 
Given the coordinates of point 
to check whether the point P 
Having two unknown variables 




can now be reached by starting at 
(C−A) and from that point walking further in the direction 
 
 Point in Triangle test [15]. 
cribe any point on the plane as: 
 
P can be inside the triangle ABC
P, we can calculate u and v using the equation above
resides inside the triangle or not, as shown below
 
 
















   
 
The point in triangle test can easily be programmed using the following pseudo code 
[15]: 
 
− // Compute vectors         
w0 = (C−A) 
w1 = (B−A) 
w2 = (P−A) 
 
− // Compute dot products 
dot00 = dot(w0, w0) 
dot01 = dot(w0, w1) 
dot02 = dot(w0, w2) 
dot11 = dot(w1, w1) 
dot12 = dot(w1, w2) 
 
− // Compute barycentric coordinates 
invDenom = 1 / (dot00 × dot11 − dot01 × dot01) 
u = (dot11 × dot02 − dot01 × dot12) × invDenom 
v = (dot00 × dot12 − dot01 × dot02) × invDenom 
 
− // Check if point is in triangle 
return (u > 0) && (v > 0) && (u + v < 1) 
 
3.2.4 The proposed secure range-free location discovery algorithm 
Putting the triangle creation method and the point in triangle test toge her, the algorithm 
of a secure range-free location discovery is now defined. Using the example shown in 
Figure 3.7, the details of how this proposed algorithm works can be explained. 
The sensor A receives three location references from sensors: U, V and W which 
are approximately one, three and two hops away from sensor A, relatively. The location 
references would be used to get the extents of the deployment map for that sensor, so that 
it contains all the location references received by the sensor node. Then the deployment 
map is quantized into small square cells, where the sensor node initializes the voting state 
of those cells to zero.  
 
 
Figure 3.7: Proposed secure range
 
The voting process starts by identifying the guide point from the closest reference 
location received, in this example it would be point U. For each of the remaining location 
references, V and W, the inner and outer 
described in section 3.2.b. The second step 
reside inside the region defined by subtraction of 
shaded area shown in Figure 
checking if any vertex of the cell is inside the shaded region using the Point
test described in section 3.2.c.
After the sensor node processes all the location references, it select  the cells with 
highest vote, and uses their ge
node (point P’ in our example)
support iterative refinement as in the original scheme presented in [8, 9]. The cells with 
maximum vote will be quantized further into smaller cells and fed back into the voting 
process algorithm again to refine the estimated locati n results.
The proposed secure range





-free location discovery scheme.
triangles would be created using the met
is the voting process of marking 
uter triangle from inner triangle (the 
3.7) and incrementing their vote by 1. This is done by 
 
ometrical centroid as the estimated location of the sensor 
. The secure range-free location discovery
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-In-Triangle 
 scheme can 
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− Receive location references {(X1, Y1, Hops1), (X2, Y2, Hops2), ...}; 
− Determine the extents of deployment field: 
− Lower left corner = min. x-coordinate and y-coordinate values among the location 
reference; 
− Upper right corner = max. x-coordinate and y-coordinate values among the 
location reference; 
− Quantize the deployment field into small square cells; 
− Select the location reference with min. hops to be the guide point. 
− For each cell in quantized deployment field, initialize the voting value to 0; 
− For each location reference (Xi, Yi, Hopsi) { 
o set outerTriangle (vertex=(Xi, Yi);  
Height=(radioRange × Hopsi);) 
o set innerTriangle (vertex=(Xi, Yi);  
Side=(radioRange × (Hopsi-1));) 
o for each cell in quantized deployment field { 
 perform PIT test on cell vertices; 
 if (PIT test returns TRUE for outerTriangle && FALSE for innerTriangle) 
increment cell vote by 1; 
} 
} 
− highVoteCells = Get the set of cells with highest vote; 
− estimatedLocation = Compute the geometrical centroid of highVoteCells; 




   
Chapter 4  
IMPLEMENTATION AND TEST RESULTS 
 
This chapter explores the implementation of both enhanced voting-based and secure 
range-free schemes on Sun SPOT wireless sensors. The scheme w re tested on a 
combination of actual SPOT and virtual SPOT sensors using Solarium, the emulation 
environment provided by Sun SPOT. Another set of tests that focused on security 
resilience under various types of attacks was performed using a simulation program 
developed for this purpose. 
 
4.1 Implementation on Sun SPOTs and System Architecture 
4.1.1  Overview on Sun SPOT wireless sensors 
The Sun SPOT sensor device is a small, wireless, battery powered experimental platform. 
It is programmed almost entirely in Java to allow programmers to create projects that 
require specialized embedded system development skills. The hardware platform includes 
a range of built-in sensors as well as the ability to easily interface to external devices 
[16]. 
A full, free-range Sun SPOT device is built by stacking a Sun POT processor 
board with a sensor board and battery, all packaged in a plastic housing, as shown in 
Figure 4.1. The smaller base-station Sun SPOT consists of only the proc ssor board in a 
plastic housing. Each Sun SPOT has a 180MHz 32-bit ARM920T core processor with 
512K RAM and 4M Flash. The Sun SPOT processor board has a 2.4GHz radio with an 
integrated on-board antenna. The radio is a TI CC2420 and is IEEE 802.15.4 compliant. 
There is no operating system used. The Sun SPOT runs a Java Virtual Machine directly 
on the hardware. The Sun SPOT uses a fully capable Java ME implementation, named 
Squawk which supports both CLDC 1.1 and MIDP 1.0, as well as providing basic OS 
functionality. The Java Virtual Machine executes directly out of flash memory. All of the 
device drivers are written in Java as well [16]. 
 
Figure 4.1:
4.1.2 Implementation system architecture
Both the enhanced voting-based and secure range
implemented in Java as library 
Sun SPOT runs an application that creates an instance of the 
library and sets the type of location discovery scheme to be used in the deployed sensor 
network. Figure 4.2 shows a block diagram of the system architecture at each 
sensor. 
The Sun SPOT sensor runs three main threads: receiving, transmitting and location 
discovery. These three threads run simultaneously a soon as the SPOT sensor is 
deployed. The receiving thread is responsible 
messages from surrounding sensors and beacon nodes. Once the receiving thread gets a 
location reference message, it checks 
in the location reference list. If the location reference 
simply ignored, otherwise, the receiving thread retrieves the hops count and other routing 
information about the source of this location refernce from the SPOT routing manager
The hops count is then attached 
location reference list. 
The transmitting thread is responsible 
location to its surrounding neighbors. 
location estimator class, and in
sensor (maximum radio range, location discovery scheme, initial quantization resolution). 
Once the SPOT sensor has received enough location reference
thread triggers the location discovery process and blocks both receiving and transmitting 
threads until the location is estimated.
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 Sun SPOT sensor [16]. 
 
 
-fr e location discovery schemes
classes to be used in Sun SPOT wireless sensors. 
secure location discovery 
for keeping track of location reference 
to ee if this location reference is already included 
has already been receiv d
with the location reference coordinates to be added to the 
for broadcasting the SPOT’s estimated 
The location discovery thread creates an instance of 
it alizes it with the basic information about the SPOT 












The secure location discovery library contains 
either enhanced voting-based scheme, or range
is the locationEstimator class which handles all the interfaces with the upper layer of 
threads.It also manages the location references, quantization of 
and cells vote generation. When a 
class it is initialized with the SPOT’s radio coverage range, initial quantization resolution
and the type of location discovery scheme to be used to stimate the SPOT’s location. 
The locationEstimator class receive
and stores those location references in 
locationEstimator receives enough location references (
minimum of three points are required to build a tringle), it sends a ready signal to the 
location discovery thread. The location discovery thread returns a request to the 
locationEstimator to initiate a location discovery process. The location discovery process 
starts by calculating the xtent of the SPOT deployment field based on the rec iv d 
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2: System architecture block diagram. 
the necessary classes to perform 
-fr e scheme. The main class in the library 
thedeployment field map 
Sun SPOT creates an instance of the locationEstimator 
s location reference from the receiving thread 
the Location Reference List. When the 






   
location references. The deployment field map is then quantized into a set of cells, each 
with a zero vote value. The locationEstimator passes the list of location references and 
cells set to the location discovery scheme specified by the Sun SPOT. The location 
discovery scheme generates the votes on the cells set and returns the set to the 
locationEstimator, which in turn extracts the cells with maximum votes value and 
calculate the geometrical centroid (center of gravity for a mass) of those cells to be the 
estimated location. 
Iterative refinement is performed by the locationEsitmator to increase the accuracy 
of the estimated location. This is done by quantizing the set of cells with maximum votes 
further into smaller sub-cells and feeding the new sub-cells back to the location discovery 
scheme for votes’ generation. The process continues until the difference b tw en two 
consecutive estimated locations are less than 5%. At this point, the locationEstimator 
returns the estimated location to the location discovery thread to be broadcasted by the 
transmitting thread. 
 
4.2 Test Cases and Simulation Results 
This thesis presents two sets of test cases. The first is implemented on Sun SPOTs 
wireless sensors to check the location discovery schemes accuracy and behavior. The 
second test case is implemented on a simulation program to investigat  he security 
resilience of the location discovery schemes to various degrees of node compromise and 
location discovery threats. 
 
4.2.1  Test on Sun SPOTs and Solarium 
The first experiment is to test the accuracy of the estimated location of both the enhanced 
voting-based scheme and the secure range-free scheme by comparing the distance error 
between the sensors’ actual location and their estimated location. The test was performed 
on Sun SPOT wireless sensors using the Solarium emulator. Solarium is a Java™ 
application that can be used to remotely manage a network of Sun SPOTs. With 
Solarium, SPOTs can be discovered and the life-cycle of the applications running on 
those devices can be managed [17].  
Solarium includes an emulator capable of running a Sun SPOT application on a 
desktop computer. This allows for testing a program before deploying it to a real SPOT, 
or if a real SPOT is not available. Instead of a physical sensor-board, virtual SPOTs have 
a sensor panel that is used to set any of the potential sensor inputs (e.g. light level, 
temperature, digital pin inputs, analog input voltages, and acceleromete valu s). The 
application controls the resources available in the virtual SPOT, just as in a real SPOT. 
 
Receiving and sending via the radio is also supported
own address and can broadcast or unicast to the other virtual SPOTs. If a shared 
basestation is available, a virtual
When a virtual SPOT 
emulator code in a Squawk 
over a socket connection with the virtual SPOT GUI
when the SPOT application changes the RGB value of an LED
to the virtual SPOT GUI code 
value. Likewise when the user clicks 
mouse, Solarium sends a message to the emulator code that the 
which can then be noticed by the SPOT application.
the Emulator architecture [17]
Figure 4.3: Block diagram of emulator architecture in Solarium
 
Each virtual SPOT has its own Squawk VM
host computer. Each Squawk VM 
of the SPOT library. This allows the
applications running on the host computer, such 
real SPOTs via radio if a shared basestation is running
The experiment was implemented 
on a network of 9 virtual SPOTs, 3 of those SPOTs were b acon nodes and th
sensor nodes, as shown in Figure 
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. Each virtual SPOT is assigned its 
 SPOT can also interact over radio with real SPOTs
is created in Solarium, a new process is started to run the 
Virtual Machine (VM). The emulator code communicates 
 code in Solarium. For example 
, that information is passed 
which updates the display for that LED with the new
on one of the virtual SPOT's switches using the 
switch has been clicked, 
 Figure 4.3. shows a block diagr
. 
 [17]
 running in a separate process on the 
also contains a complete host-side radio stack as part 
 SPOT application to communicate with other SPOT 
as other virtual SPOTs, using sockets or 
 [17]. 
twice, once for each location discovery scheme, 
4.4.  
 









The experiment starts with the beacon nodes broadcasting their locations to the 
other sensor nodes. Each sensor node receives location references from its nei
estimates its location accordingly
surrounding neighbors. After several rounds of 
modifying the estimated location
changes in estimated locations are very small.
The results recorded for the 
estimated locations for both enhanced voting
very close to the actual locations of their perspective sensor odes.










 Sun SPOTs experiment snapshot. 
. It then broadcasts the stimated location to 
exchanging location references and 
, each sensor node reaches a tabilized state where the 
 
Sun SPOT sensors, as shown in table 4.1, show that the 
-based and secure range-fr e schemes were 
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4.2.2 Simulation test and results 
In order to test the security resilience of the proposed secure location discovery schemes, 
a test program was developed in Java to simulate a network of wireless sensor nodes 
subjected to various levels of security attacks. The test program contains three classes: 
Simulator, SensorNode, and Media, as shown in Figure 4.6. The Simulator class is the 
main class which is responsible for initializing the simulated sensor network and applying 
various security threats to that network while running the simulation. The SensorNode 
class represents a simulated sensor node which has an instance of the secure location 
discovery library (similar to a Sun SPOT sensor as described in section 4.1.b) and uses 
that library to initiate a location discovery process to estimate its location. The Media 
class represents the deployment field at which the simulated sensor network is operating. 
It contains three lists: beaconNodes, sensorNodes and compromisedNodes. Each list 
contains the sensor node actual location (as generated by the Simulation c ass) and its 
estimated location (as generated by the SensorNode class). 
 
 
Figure 4.6: Simulator class diagram. 
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A test case starts by entering the parameters required by the Simulator class to 
simulate the sensor network. These parameters include the deploymnt field area, size of 
the simulated sensor network, number of beacon nodes in the simulated network, the 
radio coverage range for each sensor, maximum number of simulation rounds (so as not 
to run into infinite loops) and maximum acceptable error distance between a sensor node 
actual location and its estimated location. The Simulator class use these parameters to 
generate and initialize the simulated sensor network, and then gen rat s the location of 
each sensor randomly to fit within the simulation deployment field. Each simulated node 
is added to the Media class: beacon nodes are added to the beaconNodes list with their 
actual locations (as generated by the Simulator class) and sensor nodes are added to the 
sensorNodes list with their actual locations and setting the corresponding estimated 
locations to null value. 
The simulation starts with no security threats (0% node compromise) and each 
simulated sensor initiates a first round of location discovery using enhanced voting-based 
scheme. The simulated sensors check their surrounding neighbors for location references 
and estimate their locations accordingly and store the results in he corresponding 
position in the sensorNodes list. After all the sensors finish estimating their locations, the 
average error distance and mean execution time are calculated for this round. The sensor 
nodes continue more rounds of location discovery to further increase the accuracy of their 
estimated locations until the average error distance becomes less than or equal to the 
maximum acceptable error distance for all the sensors in the network, or the number of 
simulation rounds reaches the maximum number of rounds. 
At this point, the Simulator class resets the simulation network bac to its initial 
state and begins the simulation process again for 0% node compromise, but this time 
using secure range-free scheme for location discovery. This process is r peated for 10%, 
20%, 30%, 40% and 50% nodes compromise, and all the results of average error distance 
and average execution time are being recorded for each step. 
The security threats are simulated through the Simulator class by choosing a 
number of sensors at random to act as malicious nodes. The number of those malicious 
nodes is specified by the attack percentage of node compromise. The attack pattern is a 
combination of compromised beacon nodes attack, reply attack and masquerade attack. 
The compromised beacon nodes attack is achieved by randomly removing s me beacon 
nodes from the beaconNodes list and putting them into the compromisedNod s list where 
each compromised beacon node randomly generates a malicious location other than its 
actual location. The reply and masquerade attacks are achieved by randomly removing 
some sensor nodes from the sensorNodes list and putting them into the 
compromisedNodes list where each malicious sensor node randomly chooses a beacon 
node location to report as its own estimated location.  
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Five test cases were simulated using the test program for various network scales 
(25, 250, 500, 1000 and 1500 sensor nodes) with a maximum acceptable error distance of 
1 unit distance, as shown in table 4.2. Each network size implements both the enhanced 
voting-based and secure range-free location discovery schemes. Both schemes were 
subjected to different levels of security threats and attacks, starting from 0% node 
compromise, up to 50% node compromise in intervals of 10%. The results of those five 









Range for each 
Sensor Node 






25 5 × 5 5 3 10 1 
250 25 × 10 50 3 10 1 
500 25 × 20 100 3 10 1 
1000 50 × 20 200 3 10 1 
1500 50 × 30 300 3 10 1 
Table 4.2: Simulation tests parameters. 
 
The simulation results, as shown in Figure 4.7, show that as the network size 
increases, the security resilience improves. This is clearly shown by the percentage of 
sensors that failed to estimate their location within the acceptable error distance 
tolerance. This percentage drops as the network size increases. This is due to the location 
references for each sensor node in the network increasing as the network size grows; this 
increases the accuracy of the estimated location for each sensor a d provides more 
benign location references to withstand malicious references at various levels of attacks. 
Comparing the results of enhanced voting-based scheme with secure range-free 
scheme, as shown in Figure 4.7, the enhanced voting-based scheme is more resilient than 
the secure range-free scheme. The percentage of sensor nodes that were unable to 
estimate their locations within the acceptable error distance tolerance using enhanced 
voting-based scheme were less than the percentage of sensor nodes unabl  to estimate 
their locations using secure range-free scheme. This is because in the secure range-free 
scheme each sensor node relies on its direct neighbors to be the guide points to estimate 
its location accurately. When some of those guide points are compromised, the accuracy 
decreases and the sensor node becomes more vulnerable to security attacks. Never the 
less, the resilience of secure range-free scheme was still good enough to withhold a 
security threat of 50% node compromise, as shown in Figure  4.7(b). 
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Figure 4.7: Security resilience simulation test results. 
 
Figure 4.8 shows the average location discovery execution time. The en anced 
voting-based scheme runs faster than the secure range-free scheme. T is is because in 
secure range-free scheme, each sensor constructs a triangle from a received location 







































% of node compromise and location discovery attack
(a) Enhanced Voting-Based Scheme 
net size = 25 sensors
net size = 250 sensors
net size = 500 sensors
net size = 1000 sensors







































% of node compromise and location discovery attack
(b) Secure Range-Free Scheme 
net size = 25 sensors
net size = 250 sensors
net size = 500 sensors
net size = 1000 sensors
net size = 1500 sensors
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is the number of location references and m is the number of guide points around the 
sensor node. Therefore, as the number of guide points increase the execution time 
increases as well. This is an important factor in increasing the accuracy of location 
discovery in the secure range-free scheme. 
  
Figure 4.8: Location discovery execution time. 
 
In order to optimize the execution time for secure range-free sch me, a comparison 
experiment was made on two networks of size 250 sensors. One network with the number 
of guide points for each sensor reduced to one guide point (picked randomly), and the 
other network has the number of guide points for each sensor set to maximu . The 
results of this experiment show improvement over execution time for the first network, 
where the time becomes an O(m), as shown in Figure 4.9(b). Despite the improvement in 
execution time, a drawback in the security resilience for the first network occurs as 
shown in Figure 4.9(a). As the number of guide points decreases for a ensor node, in the 
case of an attack scenario, the probability of having malicious guide points increases. 






































   
  
 









































% of node compromise and location discovery attack
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CONCLUSION 
 
In this thesis, two location discovery schemes for wireless sensor networks are 
developed. The first scheme is an enhanced version of the voting based scheme 
developed in [8, 9] to be used for range-based location discovery. This enhanc d scheme 
is used to inspire the development of a secure range-free location discovery scheme. The 
secure range-free scheme is tested and compared to the enhanced voting-based scheme in 
both field and simulation tests. Both schemes are implemented on Sun SPOT wireless 
sensors and tested for location discovery accuracy, giving good results in terms of 
estimated locations for each deployed SPOT sensor. 
Simulation results show that both enhanced voting-based and secure range-free 
schemes are able to withstand security threats and location discovery attacks up to 50% 
of node compromise. Enhanced voting-based scheme showed resilience and accuracy 
under attack patterns more frequently than the secure range-free sch me. This is an 
inherited feature from range-based location discovery schemes. Range-free schemes tend 
to be less accurate than range-based schemes, yet more cost-ffective [18]. The 
simulation results also show that optimizing the execution time for secure range-free 
scheme will affect its security resilience as well as location estimation accuracy. 
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